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HABEAS CORPUS-LIMITING THE
AVAILABILITY OF HABEAS CORPUS AFTER
A PROCEDURAL DEFAULT
Engle v. Isaac, 102 S. Ct. 1558 (1982);
United States v. Frady, 102 S. Ct. 1584 (1982).
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since Brown v. AllenI the rule has been well-established that in
habeas corpus proceedings federal courts have the independent power to
evaluate a prisoner's constitutional claim even if a state court has already ruled on the merits of the claim. A key problem that the Supreme
Court has continued to confront after Brown is the reviewability of a
constitutional claim forfeited in the state courts by a habeas petitioner
because defense counsel failed to assert the claim at trial as required by
a state procedural rule. The resolution of this problem implicates several important issues, including the proper balance of power between
state and federal courts, the need for of finality of criminal convictions,
and the socially acceptable level of unconstitutional incarcerations.
Whether habeas corpus relief should be readily available to prisoners with constitutional claims forfeited after a procedural default is
largely a question of social policy. The Warren and Burger Courts have
reached very different conclusions regarding the proper scope of habeas
relief, even though the underlying statutory provisions 2 have remained

1

344 U.S. 443 (1953).
2 The statutory provisions interpreted by the Court in its decisions on the availability of
habeas corpus after a procedural default provide in pertinent part:
The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain
an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to
the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1976 & Suppl. III 1979).
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming
the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of
the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction
to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized
by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed
the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976 & Suppl. III 1979). Section 2254 applies to state prisoners while
§ 2255 applies to federal prisoners. For purposes of convenience, "habeas corpus" will refer to
actions under both sections.
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essentially unchanged.3 The Warren Court established that a federal
court could withhold its review of a constitutional claim forfeited in
state court only if it found that the habeas petitioner and defense counsel had deliberately bypassed state courts with the claim.4 In contrast,
the Burger Court has placed the burden on habeas petitioners to show
both "cause" for their failure to properly raise an issue in state court and
"actual prejudice" from the alleged error before a federal court will consider the issue. 5
Last term, the Supreme Court in two decisions expanded the class
of habeas petitioners who must meet the requirements of cause and
prejudice. In Engle v. Isaac,6 the Court extended the cause-and-prejudice
standard to petitioners alleging constitutional errors involving the
truthfinding function of the trial. The Isaac Court also defined the
"cause" prong so restrictively that few habeas petitioners will be able to
meet the requirement. Similarly, the Court in UnitedStates v. Frady7 defined the "actual prejudice" prong in a manner which shifts the initial
focus of a habeas proceeding to the guilt or innocence of the petitioner
and away from the constitutionality of the conviction itself. In Frady,
the Court also precluded federal courts from noticing "plain error" in
collateral proceedings.
This Note examines the two decisions, both written by Justice
O'Conner, and outlines how the Burger Court has developed the Wainwrght v. Sykes 8 cause-and-prejudice standard into a high procedural barrier which few habeas petitioners can surmount. It will then criticize
four of the assumptions relied upon by the Court in its policy of restricting the availability of habeas corpus: (1) habeas petitions place an undue burden on the federal judiciary; (2) the availability of habeas corpus
undermines the finality of criminal convictions; (3) the actions of defense counsel should bind habeas petitioners; and (4) habeas corpus undermines federalism.
II.
A.

AN OVERVIEW OF ISAAC AND FR,4DY

ENGLE V ISAAC

The habeas corpus proceeding in Engle v.Isaac arose as a result of
3 As Justice Rehnquist observed: "The foregoing discussion ... is pertinent here only as
it illustrates this Court's historic willingness to overturn or modify its earlier views of the scope
of the writ, even where the statutory language authorizing judicial action has remained unchanged." Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81 (1977).
4 See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
5 See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
6 102 S.Ct. 1558 (1982).
7 102 S. Ct. 1584 (1982).
8 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
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changes in Ohio criminal law regarding the defendant's burden of proving self-defense. For more than a century, Ohio courts required defendants to carry the burden of proving self-defense by a preponderance of
the evidence. 9 In 1974, a new state criminal code became effective, providing in pertinent part that "[t]he burden of going forward with the
evidence of an affirmative defense is upon the accused."' 0 A year later,
the Ohio Supreme Court stated in dicta that this provision did not
change Ohio's traditional allocation of the burden of proving self-defense. I I In 1976, however, the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Robinson 12
reinterpreted the statute as placing the burden of production but not the
burden of persuasion on the defendant who claims self-defense. The
13
Ohio Supreme Court later retroactively applied the Robinson decision,
but only to those defendants whose attorneys had objected at trial to the
erroneous burden of proof instruction. 14
Isaac was convicted of aggravated assault in 1975. His conviction
occured after the adoption of the new criminal code but before the decision in Robison. On appeal, Isaac relied on Robinson to challenge the
trial court's burden of proof instruction, but the court rejected this claim
on the ground that Isaac had forfeited consideration of the issue because
his attorney failed to make a timely objection at trial as required by the
state contemporaneous objection rule. 15 The Ohio Supreme Court dis6
missed Isaac's appeal for lack of a substantial constitutional question.'
A federal district court then rejected Isaac's habeas corpus petition on
the ground that Isaac failed to meet the Wainwight v.Sykes 1' requirements of showing "cause" and "actual prejudice" for his attorney's fail9 See, e.g., State v. Seliskar, 35 Ohio St. 2d 95, 298 N.E.2d 582 (1973) (per curiam); Silvus
v. State, 22 Ohio St. 90 (1871).
10 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.05(A) (Baldwin 1975). In 1978, the Ohio legislature
amended this provision to read "[t]he burden of going forward with the evidence of an affirmative defense, and the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, for an affirmative
defense, is upon the accused." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.05(A) (Baldwin 1975 & Supp.
1980).
11 State v. Rogers, 43 Ohio St. 2d 28, 30, 330 N.E.2d 674, 676 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1061 (1976).
12 47 Ohio St. 2d 103, 351 N.E.2d 88 (1976) (syllabus by the court). Under the holding in
Robinson, once the defendant produces some evidence of self-defense, the prosecution must
disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
13 State v. Humphries, 51 Ohio St. 2d 95, 364 N.E.2d 1354 (1977).
14 State v. Williams, 51 Ohio St. 2d 112, 346 N.E.2d 1364 (1977), vacated in part and remanded, 438 U.S. 911 (1978).
15 State v. Isaac, No. 346 (Ohio Ct. App. Pickaway County, Feb. 11, 1977). At the time of
Isaac's trial, Ohio's contemporaneous objection rule provided: "A party may not assign as
error the giving or failure to give any instructions unless he objects thereto before the jury
retires to consider its verdict, stating specifically the matter to which he objects and the
ground of his objection." OHIO R. CRIM. 30.
16 State v. Isaac, No. 77-412 (Ohio, July 20, 1977).
17 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
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ure to challenge the burden of proof instruction at trial.' 8 The Sixth
Cirtuit Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the futility of an objection to the jury instruction at trial satisfied the cause requirement,
while the critical importance of a correct allocation of the burden of
proof met the actual prejudice standard.19
The Supreme Court reversed on the ground that Isaac had not
shown cause for his attorney's failure to object to the trial court's erroneous jury instruction. 20 Because Isaac failed to show cause, the Court did
not consider whether the erroneous instruction had resulted in actual
21
prejudice.
After establishing that Isaac had raised a colorable constitutional
claim, 22 Justice O'Connor's majority opinion laid the policy foundation

for the decision by tallying the "significant costs" of habeas corpus.
First, "[c]ollateral review of a conviction extends the ordeal for both society and the accused. '23 Habeas corpus and other collateral proceed24
ings frustrate the achievement of finality in criminal proceedings.
Second, "[l]iberal allowance of the writ. . . degrades the prominence of
the trial itself."' 25 Ready availability of collateral remedies creates a disincentive for the parties to adhere to fair procedures at trial. 26 Third,
"writs of habeas corpus frequently cost society the right to punish admitted offenders."' 27 After a writ of habeas corpus has been granted,
retrial of successful petitioners may be difficult, if not impossible, due to
the passage of time, the failure of memory, and the dispersion of the
witnesses. 28 Fourth, "[f]ederal intrusions into state criminal trials frustrate both the States' sovereign power to punish offenders and their good
faith attempts to honor constitutional rights."'29 Repeated federal intrusions into state criminal proceedings through habeas corpus undermine
the morale of state judges and serve no significant purpose, given both
18
19
20
21
22

Isaac v. Engle, Civ. Action No. C-2-78-278 (S.D. Ohio, June 26, 1978).
Isaac v. Engle, 646 F.2d 1129 (6th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
Engle v. Isaac, 102 S. Ct. 1558 (1982).
Id. at 1575, n.43.
Id. at 1567-69. The Court rejected respondents' claim that § 2901.05(A) of the Ohio

Criminal Code implicitly required the state to prove the absence of self-defense as an element
of the crimes charged against them. d. at 1567-68. While the Court treated respondents'
other allegation-that the state could not shift the burden of proving self-defense to the defendants-as a colorable constitutional claim, id. at 1568-69, it did not reach the merits of this
claim because Isaac and his co-respondents failed to satisfy the cause and prejudice test.
23 Id. at 1571.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. Justice O'Connor provided no support for this assertion. The commentary on the
subject does not support her position. See infla note 149.
28 102 S. Ct. at 1571.
29 Id.
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the commitment and the ability of state courts to preserve constitutional
rights. 30 Justice O'Connor concluded that these four costs are especially

high when prisoners have been barred from having their constitutional
31
claims adjudicated in state courts because of a procedural default.
Relying on its perception of the costs of habeas corpus, the Court
first refused to limit the cause-and-prejudice requirement to cases in
which the constitutional error did not affect the truthfinding function of
trial. 32 Justice O'Connor asserted that the costs of habeas corpus are
unaffected by the nature of the prisoner's claim. 33 The type of alleged
constitutional error, she concluded, affects only the determination of

34
whether the cause-and-prejudice standard has been met.

The Court then held that Isaac had not shown sufficient cause for
his attorney's failure to raise the burden of proof issue at trial. It rejected at the outset his argument that the futility of objecting to the
instruction at trial constitutes cause. 35 Justice O'Connor reasoned that
to equate futility with cause would permit litigants to bypass unsympathetic state courts with their constitutional claims and thus deprive state
courts of the opportunity to revise their position on the issue. 36 The
Court also rejected Isaac's argument that a constitutional challenge to
37
the burden of proof instruction was unknown at the time of trial.
Pointing to the Court's decisions in In re Wzinship 38 and Mullaney v. Wibur,39 as well as to a variety of state and federal cases, 40 Justice
O'Connor concluded that the basis for an attack on the burden of proof
30 Id.

31 Id. at 1572. Justice O'Connor identified four reasons why the costs of habeas corpus are
especially high when a procedural default has precluded state court adjudication of a constitutional claim: (1) state courts have no opportunity to correct their errors; (2) the significance
of the trial is disminished; (3) state appellate courts are unable to correct misinterpretations of
constitutional provisions; and (4) state procedural rules are undermined. Id.
32 Id. Isaac and Frady involved challenges to erroneous jury instructions. In previous cases
where the Court applied the cause-and-prejudice standard, the alleged constitutional errors
did not affect the truthfinding function of the trial. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S.
72 (1977) (Miranda violation); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976) and Davis v.
United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973) (racial discrimination in grand jury selection).
33 102 S. Ct. at 1572.
34 Id. The nature of the claim would appear to be most relevant to a determination of the
prejudice prong of the Sykes standard. As discussed below, however, the Court's insistence on
the conjunctive application of the cause and prejudice prongs permits serious constitutional
errors to go unremedied because the cause requirement is so difficult to meet. See infia notes
71-88 and accompanying text.
35 102 S. Ct. at 1572.
36 Id. at 1572-73.
37 Id. at 1573. The Court reserved the question "whether the novelty of a constitutional
claim ever establishes cause for a failure to object." Id.
38 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
39 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
40 These cases are cited at 102 S. Ct. 1573, n.40. See infra note 42.
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instruction was "far from unknown."' 4 1 While conceding that Isaac's attorney may have overlooked a challenge to the instruction or omitted
the claim in favor of more promising defenses, Justice O'Connor held
that "[w]here the basis of a constitutional claim is available, and other
defense counsel have perceived and litigated that claim, the demands of
comity and finality counsel against labelling alleged unawareness of the
42
objection as cause of a procedural default."
102 S. Ct. at 1573.
Id. at 1574-75. The issues of the futility of making an objection at trial and the availability of a constitutional challenge to the trial court's burden of proof instruction are of central importance to understanding just how difficult the Supreme Court intends the cause
requirement to be. The sources cited by Justice O'Connor provide only the faintest support
for her assertion that a constitutional challenge to Ohio's allocation of the burden of proving
self-defense could have been constructed at the time of Isaac's trial.
At the time of Isaac's trial, one reported Ohio case hinted that the burden of proving selfdefense had been altered by § 2901.05(A) of the Ohio Criminal Code. In State v. Slone, 45
Ohio App. 2d 24, 340 N.E.2d 413 (1974) (dicta), the court of appeals cited to its earlier,
unreported decision, State v. Matthews, No. 74-AP-428 (Ohio Ct. App. Franklin County,
Dec. 24, 1974), where it had stated that defendant no longer had the burden of proving selfdefense. Slone, 45 Ohio App. 2d at 30-31, 340 N.E.2d at 418. (The Supreme Court notes the
Matthews decision at 102 S. Ct. at 1563, n.2.) The same court definitively held on August 26,
1975 that the defendant no longer shouldered the burden of proving self-defense. State v.
Robinson, 48 Ohio App. 2d 197, 356 N.E.2d 725 (1975), afd, Ohio St. 2d 102, 351 N.E.2d 88
(1976). Isaac's trial, however, was in September, 1975 and the Robinson decision was unreported for over a year.
The value of these decisions by a single court of appeals, even if known by Isaac's attorney, would have been slight. The Ohio Supreme Court apparently reaffirmed the traditional
burden of proof allocation only two months before Isaac's trial: "Inasmuch as self-defense is
an affirmative defense, which must be established by a preponderance of the evidence [,it]
. . . places the burden of going forward with the evidence upon the accused. . . to prove
that issue by a preponderance of the evidence." State v. Rogers, 43 Ohio St. 2d 28, 30, 33,
330 N.E.2d 674, 676-77 (1975) (citations omitted). In sum, at the time of Isaac's trial Ohio
case law gave only the weakest support for a challenge to the burden of proof instruction.
There was also little or no support in the legislative history of§ 2901.05(A) or in Ohio's
pattern jury instructions, practice manuals, or legal literature to suggest that the traditional
burden of proof rule had changed. Set Brief for the Respondent at 7, Isaac. But see Isaac, 102
S. Ct. 1558, 1563 n.2. Interestingly, the Supreme Court and the respondents cite some of the
same materials in reaching opposite conclusions about the availability of the constitutional
challenge at the time of trial, suggesting that it was far from well-established.
Justice O'Connor also pointed to Supreme Court decisions in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970) and Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) as providing the basis for an attack on
the burden of proof instruction. 102 S. Ct. at 1573-74. She listed twenty-five cases and two
dissenting opinions from state and federal courts where burden of proof instructions had been
challenged under Wi'nship and Mullang. Id. at 1573-74 n.40. Only one of these cases, State v.
Robinson, 47 Ohio St. 2d 103, 351 N.E.2d 88 (1976), was from Ohio and it was reported over
a year after Issac's trial. An additional four of the twenty-five were decided in September
1975, when Isaac was tried, or later. None of the cases decided or reported before Isaac's trial
involved self-defense and all but four were state cases.
Justice O'Connor also used a well-known treatise, W. LAFAVE & A. ScOr, HANDBOOK
ON CRIMINAL LAW § 8, at 46-51 (1972), to support her assertion that a challenge to the burden of proof instruction was "available." The thrust of LaFave and Scott's discussion of
affirmative defenses, however, 4eads to the opposite conclusion. They note that the courts are
divided on the question of whether the defendant or the state should have the burden of
41

42
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Although the Court once again failed to give substantive content to
the term "cause," 43 Isaac clearly demonstrates that a habeas petitioner
will not meet the cause requirement merely by showing that an objecproving the existence or non-existence of affirmative defenses and argue that after the defendant raises an affirmative defense the state properly bears the burden of proving the nonexistence of the affirmative defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 47-48. Noting the
impact of Winshi'p, the authors identify some affirmative defenses, such as insanity or alibi,
"which go directly to negative the existence of one of the essential elements of the crime" and
for which it is "clearly a denial of due process" to place the burden of proof on the defendant.
Id. at 48. They distinguish these affirmative defenses from another category in which they
explicitly include self-defense, where "the due process issue could certainly be argued either
way." Id. at 49.
Thus, the LaFave and Scott Handbook undercuts Justice O'Connor's argument in two
ways. First, it singles out self-defense as an affirmative defense to which the Winuhip due
process principles are much less likely to be applied. Second, by distinguishing self-defense
from the category of affirmative defenses that negate one of the elements of the crime, the
Handbook fails to support Justice O'Connor's heavy reliance on cases raising the latter kind of
affirmative defense. Eight of the twenty-five cases cited by Justice O'Connor involved insanity or alibi defenses, and in at least four others defendants raised related affirmative defenses.
The three student notes cited by Justice O'Connor also provide little support for her
position. The discussion of Winship in the portion of the Harvard Law Review cited to by the
Court focuses only on whether Wnship may require the state to prove the absence of affirmative defenses when establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court, 1969
Term, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1, 159 (1970). Insanity is the only affirmative defense mentioned and
the student commentator concludes that courts will be "reluctant" to place this burden on the
state. Indeed, the Isaac Court rejected respondents' attempt to force the state to prove the
absence of self-defense as part of its burden of proof. Isaac, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 1567-68 (1982).
The Ohio State Law Journal discussion of affirmative defenses focuses only on a precursor bill
to § 2901.05(A) and only obliquely implies that Ohio's traditional burden of proof allocation
for self-defense might be changed. Student Symposium, The Proposed Ohio Criminal CodeReform andRegression, 33 Oito ST. L.J. 351, 419-421 (1972). Finally, the student comment in
the Maine Law Review focused on Wilbur v. Mullaney, 473 F.2d 943 (1st Cir. 1973), remanded
414 U.S. 1139 (1974); it did not discuss the Supreme Court opinion, Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421
U.S. 684 (1975), which treated the burden of proof issues and upon which Justice O'Connor
relied. As the title of the comment suggests, the author believed that the "paramount significance" of Mullane was the failure of the adequate state ground rule to preclude federal court
rejection of a state court's interpretation of state substantive law in a habeas proceeding.
Comment, Due Process and Supremacy as Foundationsfor the Adequacy Rule.- The Remains of Federalism After Wilbur v.Mullaney, 26 ME. L. REv. 37 (1974). The author's discussion of due process
issues is cursory and provides little grist for a challenge to Ohio's burden of proof allocation
for self-defense.
Moreover, the relevance of any of these authorities to Isaac's attorney is questionable,
given the Ohio Supreme Court's apparent affirmation of the traditional burden of proof rules
only two months before Isaac's trial. State v. Rogers, 43 Ohio St. 2d 28, 30, 330 N.E.2d 674,
676 (1975).
43 Justice Rehnquist had promised in Sykes that later cases would provide a "precise definition" of the terms "cause" and "actual prejudice." Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 91
(1977). The Court did attempt to define "actual prejudice" in United States v. Frady, 102 S.
Ct. 1584, 1595 (1982).
Justice Brennan described the cause-and-prejudice standard as a "house of cards" and
expressed his dissatisfaction with the Court's efforts in Isaac and Frady: "The Court has now
begun to furnish its house of cards--and the furniture is as jerry-built as the house itself."
Isaac, 102 S. Ct. at 1580 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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tion at trial would have been futile or that defense counsel inadvertantly
or negligently failed to raise the issue. Rather, the petitioner must show
not only that the constitutional claim was not recognized at the time of
44
trial, but also that there existed no "tools" for constructing the claim.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented vigorously,
attacking both the policy assumptions relied upon by the majority and
45
the application of the cause-and-prejudice standard to Isaac's petition.
He questioned the Court's assumption that prisoners would consider it
an ordeal to test an allegedly unconstitutional conviction in federal
court and saw no significant societal interest in ensuring the finality of
convictions potentially tainted by constitutional error.46 He accused the
majority of "sheer demagoguery" in blaming the successful habeas petitioner for the difficulties of retrial 47 and attacked the notion that Isaac
48
and his co-respondents were "admitted offenders."1

Justice Brennan also faulted the majority for its use of the principle
of comity to limit federal court consideration of habeas petitions: "It is
inimical to the principle of federal constitutional supremacy to defer to
state courts' 'frustration' at the requirements of federal constitutional
law . . . . 49 Finally, Justice Brennan dissented from the extension of
the cause-and.prejudice standard to errors involving the truthfinding
function of trial. 50 He argued that an unconstitutionally allocated burden of proof renders the entire trial untrustworthy, while unconstitutionally obtained evidence, for example, remains trustworthy. 51 The
majority's extension of the standard, Justice Brennan argued, ignored
52
that vital distinction.

44 Isaac, 102 S. Ct. at 1574. The Court concluded that Isaac's attorney did not lack "the
tools to construct [the] constitutional claim." Id. Apparently, the Court is charging defense
attorneys with the affirmative duty to raise even the most remote constitutional claims. See,
e.g., id. at 1580 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Court is rejecting inchoateness as "cause"). The
Court indicates, for example, that judicial rfefcdion of a claim is sufficient to put defense attorneys on notice that "the issue had been perceived by other defendants and that it was a live
one in the courts at the time." 102 S. Ct. at 1574 n.41.
45 Justice Brennan accused the majority of being "result-oriented" by reshaping Isaac's
habeas petition in order to extend the cause-and-prejudice standard. He argued that the
petition should have been dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies. Id. at 1576-80
(Brennan, J., dissenting). This charge brought an angry rejoinder from Justice O'Connor. Id.
at 1569 n.25.
46 Id. at 1581-82 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
47 Id. at 1582 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 1582-83 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
51 Id.
52 Id. Justice Blackmun concurred in result without opinion. Id. at 1575 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring). Justice Stevens argued that the majority was unduly preoccupied with "procedural hurdles" and should have reversed on the ground that the alleged errors were insufficiently prejudicial to warrant a habeas remedy. Id. at 1576 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
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UNITED STATES V FRADY

In 1963, Joseph Frady was convicted in federal district court of first
degree murder and robbery. 53 The trial judge improperly equated intent with malice in his jury instructions, but Frady's attorney made no
objection and thus failed to preserve the issue for appeal under Rule 30
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,5 4 the federal contemporaneous objection rule. 55 In 1979, Frady collaterally attacked his conviction in a motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255,56
57
alleging that the erroneous jury instruction denied him a fair trial.
The district court denied Frady's motion on the ground that Frady
should have challenged the erroneous instruction on appeal or in an
earlier collateral attack. 58 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed, concluding that the proper standard to apply was that
of "plain error" in Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 59 rather than the Wainwright v. Sykes cause-and-prejudice test. 60
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the "plain error" standard is inappropriate in collateral attacks on federal criminal convictions. 6 ' Justice O'Connor instead concluded that the cause-andand dissenting in part). Justice Stevens believes that a habeas corpus inquiry should focus on
whether the alleged error involves "fundamental unfairness" rather than on the procedural
history of the claim. Id. See also, Rose v. Lundy, 102 S. Ct. 1198, 1213 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
53 United States v. Frady, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1587-88 (1982). At that time, the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia had exclusive jurisdiction over local felonies. Id. at 1590.
54 Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in pertinent part: "No
party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless he objects
thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict .... ." FED. R. CRIM. P. 30.
55 Between his conviction and the present case, Frady mounted eight collateral attacks on
his conviction. Frady, 102 S. Ct. at 1589 n.4. Only one of these was successful. United States
v. Frady, 607 F.2d 383 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
56 For the text of § 2255, see supra note 2.
57 Jury instructions identical to those given at Frady's trial had been found to be reversible error in United States v. Whatron, 433 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1970) and Green v. United
States, 405 F.2d 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1968). The government argued that even earlier decisions
cast doubt on the propriety of the jury instructions. Brief for the Petitioner at 33. See also
Frady, 102 S. Ct. at 1594 n.16.
58 The district court's decision is unreported.
59 Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: "Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court." FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b).
60 United States v. Frady, 636 F.2d 506, 510 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The court of appeals found
the jury instruction clearly erroneous and remanded the case for a new trial or entry of a
judgment of manslaughter. Id. at 514.
6t United States v. Frady, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1592 (1982). In Isaac, the Court noted that
federal habeas corpus challenges by state prisoners cause greater problems of finality and
comity than do challenges by federal prisoners and held that the "plain error" standard is also
inappropriate for collateral challenges by state prisoners. Engle v. Isaac, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 1575
(1982).
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prejudice requirement was the proper test to apply. 62 While conceding
that comity was not an issue because Frady was a federal prisoner, Justice O'Connor argued that the ruling was justified on the ground that
the federal government has a strong interest in the finality of its criminal
judgments. 63 She also noted that federal prisoners, unlike state prisoners, already have had an opportunity to raise constitutional claims in
64
federal trial and appellate courts.
Justice O'Connor then applied the prejudice prong of the Skes
standard to Frady's petition. 65 Relying upon Henderson v. Kibbe 66 and
Cupp v. Naughten,67 she established the degree of prejudice that habeas
petitioners must demonstrate before a federal court will consider their
claims: the error must so pervade the entire trial that the defendant's
conviction' violates due process. 68 Trial errors are not presumptively
prejudicial, 69 and even the impact of those affecting the truthfinding
70
function of the trial must be viewed in the context of the entire trial.
Justice O'Connor also indicated that "affirmative evidence indicating
that [the petitioner] had been convicted wrongfully of a crime of which
he was innocent" may be necessary before actual prejudice will be estabFrady, 102 S. Ct. at 1594.
63 Id. at 1593.
64 Id. Justice O'Connor reasoned that use of the plain error standard would put federal
prisoners in a preferred position vis-A-vis state prisoners. Id. Justices Blackmun and Brennan
disputed this contention, arguing that many states allow plain error exceptions to contemporaneous objection rules. Id. at 1599 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 1602-03 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
Justice O'Connor also emphasized the weight which reviewing courts are to give
convictions:
62

Once the defendant's chance to appeal has been waived or exhausted . . . we are entitled to presume he stands fairly and finally convicted, especially when, as here, he already has had a fair opportunity to present his federal claims in a federal forum. Our
trial and appellate procedures are not so unreliable that we may not afford their completed operation any binding effect beyond the next in a series of endless post-conviction
collateral attacks. To the contrary, a final judgment commands respect.
Id. at 1593.
65 Id. at 1594. While never explicitly holding that Frady was unable to show cause for his
attorney's failure to object at trial, Justice O'Connor implied that the Court considered a
challenge to a jury instruction neither futile nor unknown at the time of trial. Id. at 1594
n.16.
66 431 U.S. 145 (1977).
67 414 U.S. 141 (1973).
68 102 S. Ct. at 1595. See also Rose v. Lundy, 102 S. Ct. 1198, 1216 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (similar formulation). Other members of the Court have suggested less stringent
definitions of actual prejudice. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97-99 (White, J.,
concurring in judgment) (harmless error).
69 "[Frady] must shoulder the burden of showing, not merely that the errors at his trial
created a possibilio of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions." 102 S. Ct. at 1596.
70 Id. at 1595.
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lished. 7' Because strong evidence of malice existed in the record and
Frady failed to make a showing that he had acted without malice, the
Court saw no risk of a "fundamental miscarriage of justice," and held
72
that Frady had not established actual prejudice.
C.

IS.4AC AND FRADY:

ERECTING AN AIRTIGHT SYSTEM OF

PROCEDURAL FORFEITURES

Isaac and Frady add little to the theoretical underpinnings of the
Burger Court's effort to limit the availability of habeas corpus. Justice
O'Connor relied almost entirely on principles articulated by Justices
Powell 73 and Rehnquist 74 in prior cases. The two decisions are important, however, because they raise the procedural barriers faced by
habeas corpus petitioners by restrictively defining "cause" and "actual
prejudice," by refusing to limit the application of the cause-andprejudice standard to errors involving the truthfinding function of trial,
and by precluding federal courts from noticing plain error in collateral
proceedings.
As applied in the two cases, the cause-and-prejudice standard will
make it highly improbable that a prisoner who has fallen victim to a
procedural default can obtain a hearing on a habeas petition that raises
the forfeited issue. In fact, the cause-and-prejudice requirement perversely makes it more likely that serious constitutional errors will be immune from collateral attack after a procedural default. This effect stems
from the Court's insistence on the conjunctive application of the cause
and actual prejudice prongs of the Sykes test. In a key footnote in Isaac,
Justice O'Connor rejected the argument that the prejudice arising from
the improper allocation of the burden of proving self-defense was so
great that the Court should grant relief even in the absence of cause. 75
She stated that the Sykes test is to be applied conjunctively; habeas petitioners must meet both prongs of the test before they can obtain a hear76
ing on the merits of their petition.
71 Id. at 1596. In an influential article often relied upon by the Burger Court in its habeas
corpus decisions, Judge Friendly suggested that a "colorable showing of innocence" should be
a prerequisite to collateral relief. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? CollateralAttacks on Criminal
Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 142 (1970). In contrast, the Warren Court focused on the
constitutionality of the conviction itself and did not require a showing of innocence as a
prerequisite for habeas relief. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 394-95 (1963).
72 Frady, 102 S. Ct. at 1596. Justice Stevens concurred, Justice Blackmun concurred in the
judgement, and Justice Brennan dissented. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Marshall took
no part in the case.
73 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 250 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring). See also
Stone v. Powell, 421 U.S. 465 (1976).
74 Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
75 Engle v. Isaac, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 1575 n.43 (1982).
76 Id.
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Justice O'Connor's confidence that "victims of a fundamental miscarriage of justice will meet the cause-and-prejudice standard" 77 is misplaced.7 8 Conjunctive application of the Sykes standard creates a
predicament from which few habeas petitioners can escape. To show
"actual prejudice" petitioners shoulder the heavy burden of demonstrating that the alleged constitutional error so infected their entire trial that
their conviction violates due process. 79 In most cases this will mean that
prisoners must make a colorable showing of innocence before actual
prejudice can be established.8 0 To show "cause," habeas petitioners
must show that the "tools" for constructing a constitutional claim were
81
unavailable at the time of the procedural default.
The habeas petitioner's predicament arises because very few errors82 will be of sufficient gravity to meet the prejudice prong where the
basis of the claim was either non-existent at the time of trial or so speculative that the cause requirement is met. Conversely, a constitutional
claim that is sufficiently inchoate at the time of trial to meet the cause
requirement is not likely to be sufficiently prejudicial to meet the
prejudice standard. Because errors that render trials "fundamentally
unfair" are especially susceptible of being recognized at the time of trial,
defendants whose counsel fail to make timely objections to these errors
will almost invariably be unable to meet the cause requirement. The
conjunctive application of the cause-and-prejudice standard creates a
Catch-22 for habeas petitioners.
The Court has already closed several escape routes from this predicament. In some cases, the cause-and-prejudice requirement might be
met through retroactive application of a constitutional right that was
not recognized at the time of trial. In Hankerson v. North Carolina,83 however, the Court indicated that states could insulate past convictions from
the retroactive application of newly recognized constitutional rights
through the use of contemporaneous objection rules. Thus, when a constitutional right is established and applied retroactively, collateral relief
can be restricted to those defendants who had asserted the right at
trial.84
77 Id. at 1575.
78 Justice Stevens noted that the cause-and-prejudice test diverts courts from the issue of
the fairness of the trial. d. at 1576 n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
79 See, e.g., United States v. Frady, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1595 (1982).
80 Id. at 1596.
81 See, e.g., Isaac, 102 S. Ct. at 1572.
82 Two examples are the deliberate withholding of evidence by the prosecution and the
use of perjured testimony knowingly offered by the prosecution. Reitz, FederalHabeas Corpus
Postconviction Remed for State Prisoners, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 461, 465 (1960).
83 432 U.S. 233, 244 n.8 (1977).
84 This is precisely what happened in Isaac. The Ohio Supreme Court retroactively applied a new formulation of the burden of proof allocation for self-defense, State v. Humphries,
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Ineffective assistance of counsel is another possible escape route
from the effect of the conjunctive application of the cause-and-prejudice
standard. Some lower courts have concluded that attorney error or negligence, although falling short of that necessary to make out a separate
sixth amendment claim, can satisfy the cause requirement. 85 Justice
O'Connor indicated in Isaac, however, that defense counsel's non-deliberate failure to raise an issue does not by itself constitute inadequate
6
assistance of counsel sufficient to show cause for a procedural default.
Although the closing of these escape routes adds to the predicament, the plight of those prisoners who are "victims of a fundamental
miscarriage of justice" is best illustrated by the Court's application of
the cause-and-prejudice standard to errors affecting the determination
of guilt itself. By extending the stringent cause-and-prejudice standard
to errors involving the truthfinding function of trial, the Court undermines its own emphasis on the question of guilt and innocence in collateral proceedings.8 7 Because of inability to show cause, many innocent
petitioners will be barred from presenting their claims of a gross miscarriage of justice to a federal court. The Court compounds this effect by
ending the power of the federal courts to notice plain error in collateral
51 Ohio St. 2d 95, 364 N.E.2d 1254 (1977), but limited retroactive application to defendants
whose attorneys had objected to the traditional allocation at trial. State v. Williams, 51 Ohio
St. 2d 112, 364 N.E.2d 1364 (1977), vacated in part and remanded, 438 U.S. 91 (1978).
Moreover, new constitutional rights are rarely recognized in a vacuum. Isaac charges
defense attorneys with the responsibility of discerning emerging constitutional rights, even if
only from judicial rejections of claims of such rights. 102 S. Ct. at 1572-75. Thus, it will be
extremely difficult for habeas petitioners to show cause for their attorney's failure to recognize
a constitutional challenge before the underlying right was judicially recognized and retroactively applied.
85 See, e.g., Runnels v. Hess, 653 F.2d 1359 (10th Cir. 1981); Tyler v. Phelps, 622 F.2d 172
(5th Cir. 1980) rev'd, 643 F.2d 1095 (5th Cir. 1981); Rachel v. Bordenkircher, 590 F.2d 200
(6th Cir. 1978). See also Note, Attorney Erroras "Cause" Under Wainwright v. Sykes: The Casefora
ReasonablenessStandardafter Washington v. Downes, 67 VA. L. REv. 415 (1981); Comment, Federal
Habeas Corpus Review of Unintentionaly Defaulted Defaulted ConstitutionalClaims, 130 U. PA. L.
RE,.. 981 (1982).
86 102 S. Ct. 1574-75. The first Tyler decision focused on the quality of the representation
with respect to the particular attorney action or inaction causing the procedural default:
It may well be that although Tyler's trial counsel was sufficiently competent overall to
have provided effective assistance of counsel for purposes of the Sixth Amendment, his
decision not to object to the [jury instruction] was not a competent decision. If so, then
the 'cause' prong of.ykes will be satisfied ....
Tyler, 622 F.2d at 178.
In contrast, Justice O'Connor's statement that criminal defendants are entitled only to a
"competent attorney" and her restrictive definition of "cause" suggests that the Court will not
focus on the particular action by the defense attorney which led to the procedural default
when determining if there was ineffective representation sufficient to meet the cause requirement. Isaac, 102 S. Ct. at 1574-75. The Court probably intends that only ineffective assistance of counsel rising to a sixth amendment violation will meet the cause requirement.
87 See, e.g., United States v. Frady, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1596 (1982).
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proceedings.8
By raising the procedural barriers for the habeas petitioner, by insisting on the conjuctive application of the cause-and-prejudice standard, and by ending the use of plain error review in collateral
proceedings, Isaac and Frady signal much greater judicial tolerance for
the unconstitutional incarcerations of guilty and innocent alike.

III.
A.

THE BURGER COURT'S DRIVE To LIMIT THE AVAILABILITY OF
HABEAS CORPUS AFTER A PROCEDURAL DEFAULT
BACKGROUND:

THE WARREN COURT POSITION

Modern habeas corpus jurisprudence began in 1953 with Brown v.
Allen .89 In Brown, the Court held that federal courts could review constitutional claims raised by state prisoners even if state courts had
reached the merits of the claim. 90 State court rulings on questions of
law were not binding on federal judges under the habeas corpus statute,
the Brown Court concluded, because the congressionally mandated function of habeas corpus is to permit correction of constitutional errors left
unremedied by the state courts.9 '
Brown marked the final step in the Court's slow expansion of the
range of issues cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceedings.9 2 The
Court, however, still maintained an important limit on the availability
of habeas corpus. In Daniels v. Allen, which was one of the cases consolidated with Brown, the Court held that a state procedural rule which
bars review of a constitutional claim by state courts also precludes fed93
eral court examination of the issue in a habeas proceeding.
A decade later, in the landmark case of Fay v. Noia,94 the Court
again faced the question of the effect to be given a default under state
procedural rules. There, Noia and his two co-defendants had been convicted of murder solely on the basis of their confessions. Noia's co-defendants were later released on the ground that their confessions had
been coerced, but Noia did not appeal his conviction. 95 In a lengthy
opinion by Justice Brennan, the Supreme Court held that Noia's failure
88 See Frad, 102 S. Ct. at 1592-94; Isaac, 102 S. Ct. at 1575.
89 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
90 Id. at 458. See also id. at 500 (opinion of Justice Frankfurter).
91 Id. at 506 (opinion of Justice Frankfurter). "IT]he state adjudication carries the weight
that federal practice gives to the conclusion of a court of last resort of another jurisdiction on
federal constitutional issues. It is not resjudicata." Id. at 458 (opinion of the Court).
92 For a discussion of the various historical interpretations of this development, see infia
note 111.
93 344 U.S. 443, 482-87 (1953). Daniels's attorney missed by one day the deadline for
filing a statement of the case on appeal. Daniels had been sentenced to death. Id. at 484-85.
94 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
95 Id. at 394-95.
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to appeal his conviction in state court did not bar review of his constitu96
tional claim in a federal habeas proceeding.
Fay marks the greatest extension of habeas corpus relief to prisoners
whose constitutional claims have been forfeited in state court because of
a procedural default. After reviewing the history of the writ of habeas
corpus, Justice Brennan concluded that "federal court jurisdiction is
conferred by the allegation of an unconstitutional restraint and is not
'97
defeated by anything that may occur in the state court proceedings.
The Fy Court recognized that the power of federal judges to act on
the habeas petitions of prisoners whose state remedies have been forclosed by a procedural default lessened the finality of some criminal convictions and affected the balance of power between state and federal
courts. The Court attacked the finality problem by stressing that habeas
corpus is a unique civil remedy for unlawful imprisonments rather than
a mere stage in state criminal proceedings. The opinion then identified
a "manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal
liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary
federal judicial review." 98 While conceding that Fay might make it
somewhat more difficult for states to regulate their criminal procedures,
Justice Brennan distinguished the lesser interest of the states in maintaining their procedures from that of preserving the integrity of their
substantive law. 99 Nevertheless, to protect state criminal procedures the
Court held that federal judges could deny habeas relief to a prisoner
who had "deliberately bypassed" state courts with a constitutional claim
and had thereby forfeited state court remedies. 1°0 The Court stressed
that the habeas petitioner must have "understandingly and knowingly"
consented to the decision to bypass the state courts.101
In sum, Fay and its progeny struck a balance in favor of the ready
availability of federal vindication of the rights of unconstitutionally detained prisoners and against the states' interest in both the finality of
their criminal convictions and the consistent operation of their criminal
procedures. A deliberate decision by the defense to circumvent the state
Id. at 398-99.
97 Id. at 436.
98 Id. at 424.
99 Id. at 431-34. "[T]his state interest in an airtight system of forfeitures is of a different
order from that. . . in the autonomy of state law within the proper sphere of its substantive
regulation." Id. at 432.
10o Id. at 438.
101 Id. at 439. The Court adopted as the standard of deliberateness the waiver standard of
96

Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) ("an intentional relinquishment or abandonment
of a known right or privilege").
The Court appeared to retreat from this formulation in Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S.
443, 451-52 (1965), where it suggested that deliberate tactical decisions by defense counsel
might bind the defendant in some circumstances.
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court was the touchstone for determining whether a procedural default
barred federal habeas relief.
B.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BURGER COURT'S POSITION AND ITS

POLICY RATIONALES

The Burger Court actively began to limit the availability of habeas
corpus in Davis v. United States. 10 2 Three years after his conviction, Davis
challenged his conviction on the ground that blacks had been systematically excluded from the grand jury which indicted him. 10 3 His attorney
had not challenged the composition of the grand jury before trial, thus
waiving the issue under Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.' 0 4 In an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, the Court held that a
deliberate bypass standard was inappropriate for determining whether a
petitioner could resort to habeas corpus after he had forfeited a challenge to the grand jury composition. 10 5 The Court instead ruled that
Davis had to show "cause" for and "actual prejudice" from his attorney's failure to make a timely objection. 10 6 The Davis Court did not
define these two terms, however, nor did it dwell on the policy justifications for its encroachment on Fay. The Court simply deemed it "inconceivable" that Congress intended to permit a more liberal waiver
standard in habeas corpus proceedings than that applicable in the pretrial period under Rule 12(b).107 Justice Rehnquist also suggested that
liberal waiver rules encourage defense attorneys to delay challenges until a collateral proceeding because the greater difficulties of retrial after
a successful collateral attack make release of the defendant more likely
than if a successful challenge was mounted before trial. 0 8
102 411 U.S. 233 (1973).
103 Id. at 235.
104 Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure then provided in pertinent
part that "[d]efenses and objections based on defects in the institution of the prosecution or in
the indictment. . . may be raised only by motion before trial," and that the failure to do so
"constitutes a waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relief from the
waiver." FED. R. GRIM. P. 12(b)(2). The provisions of Rule 12(b)(2) were later divided into
Rules 12(b) and 12(l).
105 Davis, 411 U.S. at 242.
106 Id. at 241-42. The Court derived this requirement from the "for cause shown" language of Rule 12(b) and from Shotwell Manufacturing Company v. United States, 371 U.S.
341, 361-64 (1963).
107 411 U.S. at 241-242.
108 Davis, 411 U.S. at 241. The alleged propensity of defense attorneys to deliberately
withhold a constitutional claim until collateral proceedings ("sandbagging") has been heavily
relied upon by the Court in restricting the availability of habeas corpus. Set, e.g., Engle v.
Isaac, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 1572, n.34 (1982); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 89-90 (1977).
The accuracy of this assumption is questionable. See inqfa notes 163-66 and accompanying

text.
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In an important concurring opinion in Schneckloth v. Bustanonte'0 9
later in the same term, Justice Powell more clearly outlined the rationale for the Burger Court's effort to limit the availability of habeas
corpus. Justice Powell first argued that the Warren Court's expansive
view of habeas corpus in Fay was based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the historical purpose and development of the Great Writ.
At common law, he asserted, a court considering a habeas corpus petition could do no more than verify the jurisdiction of the court which
had ordered the incarceration of the petitioner.110 He also argued that
Congress did not intend the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 to increase significantly the power of federal courts to review state court judgments in
habeas corpus proceedings."'I The costs of the expansion of habeas
corpus beyond its historic function, according to Justice Powell, included the diversion ofjudicial resources to collateral proceedings," 12 an
undermining of the finality of criminal judgment," 13 and an imbalance
of power between the state and federal judiciaries.' '4 In order to minimize these costs, Justice Powell argued, the function of habeas corpus
109 412 U.S. 218, 250 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist joined in the opinion. Justice Blackmun agreed with "nearly all" of the concurrence. Id. at 249 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The thrust of Justice Powell's concurrence was
that fourth amendment claims should not be cognizable in habeas proceedings. The Court
later adopted this position in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
tlo Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 254 (Powell, J., concurring).
1I Id. at 255. The history and development of habeas corpus is a key issue in the debate
over the proper scope of habeas corpus. The major differences concern the nature of the writ
at the time it was incorporated into the Constitution (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2) and the
effect of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 (The Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385)
which provided a federal habeas corpus remedy for state prisoners.
The Warren Court concluded that at the time of its incorporation into the Constitution,
"it was settled that the writ lay to rest any restraint contrary to fundamental law,. . . [which]
in this country was embodied in the written Constitution." Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 426
(1963). The Court also established that the jurisdiction to remedy unconstitutional restrictions conferred upon the Federal courts by the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 was "not defeated
by anything that may occur in the state court proceedings." d.
The Burger Court, in contrast, has concluded that at the time it was incorporated into
the Constitution habeas corpus could only be used to verify the jurisdiction of the sentencing
court. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.-. 218, 253-54 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring). The
Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, according to the Burger Court, did not "jettison the respect
theretofore shown by a reviewing court for prior judgments by a court of proper jurisdiction."
Id. at 255.
Several commentators have supported the Burger Court's historical analysis. See, e.g.,
Bator, Finality in Criminal Lau, and FederalHabeas Corpurfor State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REv.
441, 466-99 (1963); Mayer, The FederalHabeas Corpus Act of 1867- The Suprene Court as Legal
Historian, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 31 (1965); Oaks, Legal History in the High Court-HabeasCorpus,
64 MICH. L. REv. 451 (1966). But see Reitz, FederalHabeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive State
Poceeding, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1315, 1325-32 (1961); Note, Developments in the Law-Habeas
Corpus, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1038, 1042-62 (1970) (hereinafter cited as Developments in the Law).
112 &-hneckloth, 412 U.S. at 259-61 (Powell, J., concurring).
'3 M. at 261-62.
'14 Id. at 263-65.
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should be limited to redressing fundamentally unjust incarcerations.," 5
On the basis of this analytic framework, the Burger Court moved to
restrict futher the availability of habeas corpus. In Francis v. Henderson ,116 the Court extended Davis to bar collateral challenges by state
prisoners to grand jury compositions absent a showing of cause for and
prejudice from their attorney's failure to make a timely objection. The
Court in Estelle v. Williams 1 7 repudiated Fay's requirement that a defendant must knowingly consent to bypassing a state court before he
would be barred from later raising the issue in a habeas proceeding.
The Court concluded, in a footnote, that the Fay waiver standard did
not apply to actions of defense counsel that resulted in a forfeiture of
constitutional rights unless these rights were "fundamental." '1 8 Thus,
the Estelle Court effectively bound habeas petitioners not only to the
tactical decisions of defense counsel but also to their negligence and inadvertent errors. 119
Wainwright v. Skes ' 20 expanded the application of the cause-andprejudice standard and set forth the Burger Court's defense of its use of
state procedural rules to preclude federal habeas review. The Court
held that a state contemporaneous objection rule was an independent
and adequate state ground which barred federal habeas review absent a
12 1
showing of cause and prejudice.
Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist noted that contemporaneous objection rules are designed both to enhance the making of the
record when the recollection of witnesses are freshest and to permit trial
judges to make factual determinations while scrutinizing the demeanor
of the witnesses. 122 By forcing defense attorneys to raise objections, these
rules cause the early exclusion of tainted evidence, which sometimes
115 Id. at 257-58. Justice Powell limited the concept of "unjust incarceration" to the im-

prisonment of innocent individuals. Id. at 256.
116 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
117 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
118 Id. at 508 n.3. The Court distinguished the few "fundamental" rights which
personal waiver by the defendant, such as waiving a jury trial, from "strategic and
decisions, even those with constitutional implications," which can be forfeited by
counsel. Id. See also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 91 n.14 (1977).
119 Williams had been tried in his prison clothes after asking for non-prison garb,

require
tactical
defense
but his

attorney had failed to object even though the law was clear in the federal circuit that defendants could not be compelled to be tried in their prison uniform. 425 U.S. at 503-04. The
Supreme Court found that compelling a defendant to appear in prison clothing was a due
process violation, but held that "[Williams's attorney's] failure to make an objection to the
court as to being tried in such clothes,for whatever reason, is sufficient to negate the presence of
compulsion necessary to establish a constitutional violation." Id. at 512-13 (emphasis added).
120 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
121 Id. at 86-87.
122 Id. at 88.

SUPREME COURT REVIEW

1630

[Vol. 73

leads to the prompt acquittal of the defendant.1 23 State court rulings on
the objections raised by defense attorneys aid federal judges in later proceedings and compel prosecutors to reexamine the strength of their
cases.' 24 Justice Rehnquist also asserted that by undermining the operation of contemporaneous objection rules, Pay's deliberate bypass standard encouraged defense attorneys to withhold constitutional claims
from state courts. 25 Finally, these rules increase the significance of the
trial as the "main event" where social resources126are concentrated to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.
IV.

FOUR MAJOR ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THE HABEAS
CORPUS POLICY OF THE BURGER COURT: A CRITIQUE

The sharp differences in the habeas corpus jurisprudence of the
Warren and Burger Courts graphically illustrate that the Court's decison-making in this area is fundamentally one of social policy. Consequently, an evaluation of Isaac and Frady is proper only after critically
examining the assumptions which underlie the Burger court's habeas
corpus decisions. Four key assumptions can be identified: (1) habeas
corpus severely burdens the federal judiciary; (2) habeas corpus unduly
frustrates the achievement of finality in the criminal justice system; (3)
the habeas petitioner is properly bound by defense counsel's nondeliberate failure to raise a constitutional claim; and (4) habeas corpus disrupts
the relationship between the federal and state court systems.
A.

BURDEN ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY

Proponents of the restriction of the availability of habeas corpus
argue that the processing of habeas petitions places an intolerable burden on the federal courts. In his concurring opinion in Brown v. Allen,
Justice Jackson decried the "flood"of habeas petitions which were "inundating" the federal courts.' 27 One thousand eighty-one habeas petitions per year were "flooding" the federal courts in 1952.128 The
number of habeas petitions rose steadily in the 1950s and rapidly in the
1960s, and by 1970 over 12,000 were filed each year. 129 The Warren
123 Id. at 88-89.
124 Id. at 89.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 90.
127 344 U.S. 443, 536 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). Complaints about the burden of
habeas corpus on the federal judiciary have continued unabated since Brown. Cf. Rose v.
Lundy, 102 S. Ct. 1198, 1218 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("flood of litigation").
128 DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 126-27 (1956)
[hereinafter cited as ANNUAL REPORT with parenthetical indication of year of report]. Of
these petitions, 541 were filed by state prisoners.
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Court's extension of constitutional protections to state criminal defendants accounted for much of the rise in the number of petitions; 130 the
easier availability of the writ, 13 1 the increasing sophistication of prison

inmates, 132 and the decline of prison censorship 133 were contributing
factors. Since 1970, the number of habeas petitions filed each year has
leveled off and by 1980 fewer petitions were being filed than a decade
before. 134
In relative terms, the burden placed upon the federal judiciary by
habeas petitions has actually decreased significantly over the last decade. For example, the number of federal district judges has increased by
twenty-nine percent, from 400 in 1971 to 516 in 1981.135 Similarly, the
number of court of appeals judgeships has increased by thirty-six percent, from ninety-seven in 1971 to 132 in 1981.136 Even more striking is

the near doubling in the number of state and federal prisoners, from
198,061 in 1971l37 to over 394,000 by mid-1982.' 38 Thus, while the
number of habeas petitions has actually dropped during the last decade,
129

The trend over four decades in the number of habeas petitions filed in the federal

district courts is illustrated below:
YEAR

HABEAS
PETITIONS

1940
1945
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980

MOTIONS TO VACATE

538
1,176
1,254
1,251
1,733
5,872
10,663
9,525
8,444
SOURCE: ANNUAL REPORT (1940-80), supra note 128.

112
279
538
1,244
1,729
1,690
1,322

TOTAL

538
1,176
1,366
1,530
2,271
7,116
12,392
11,215
9,766

130 Cover & Aleinikoff, DialecticalFederalism: Habeas Corpus andthe Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035,
1041-42 (1977); McFeeley, Habeas Corpus andDue Process: From Warren to Burger, 28 BAYLOR L.
REv. 533, 537-40 (1976); Shapiro,FederalHabeas Corpus: A Stud in Massachusetts, 87 HARV. L.
REv. 321, 321-22 (1973).
131 Schaefer, Federalismand State CriminalProcedure,70 HARV. L. REv. 1, 21 (1956); Shapiro,

supra note 130, at 321-22.

132 Schaefer, supra note 131, at 21.
133 Id.
134 ANNUAL REPORT (1979-80), supra

note 128. The number of prisoner petitions as a
whole rose sharply from 15,997 in 1970 to 27,711 in 1981, but this increase was entirely attributable to non-habeas actions, especially civil rights petitions. ANNUAL REPORT (1981), supra
note 128, at 211 (Tables 20-21).
135 ANNUAL REPORT (1971, 1981). Even more striking is the increase in the 1960's, when
the number of authorized judgeships increased from 245 to 401. Set ANNUAL REPORT (1981),
supra note 128, at 205 (Table 15).
136 Id. at 185 (Table 1).
137 DEPT. OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS 1925-81, at 2 (1982).
138 DEPT. OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS AT MIDYEAR 1982, at 1 (1982). The prison population
growth rate in the first half of 1982 was equivalent to a 14.3% annual increase. Id.
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both the federal judiciary and the pool of potential habeas petitioners
have grown substantially.
The evidence also indicates that the processing of habeas petitions
does not unduly burden individual federal judges. 3 9 For example, during the twelve month period ending June 30, 1981, 10,171 habeas petitions were terminated in federal district court, or an average of about
twenty per judge. 40 The district courts took no action on 697 of these
petitions and disposed of the vast majority (9,122) before the pretrial
stage.' 4 ' An additional 148 were disposed of during or after the pretrial
stage, leaving only 204 petitions to be disposed of at an evidentiary hearing.1 4 2 Evidentiary hearings on habeas petitions do not consume a large
share of court time. Of the 222 habeas trials held during the year ending June 30, 1981, 171 lasted one day or less and all but eleven were
completed in three days or less.143
B.

THE FRUSTRATION OF FINALITY

In an influential article 4 4 upon which the Supreme Court heavily
relies in its habeas corpus decisions, Professor Bator argued that the
finality of convictions is important to the criminal justice system for
three reasons. First, finality permits the conservation of the intellectual,
moral, political, and economic resources of the legal system.145 Second,
finality is essential to achieve the deterrent, educational, and,rehabilitative functions of the criminal justice system. 4 6 Third, Bator argues that
139 See Carroll, Habeas Corpus Reform: Can Habeas Survive the Flood?, 6 Cum. L. REv. 363,
371-78 (1975); Chisum, In Defense of Modem Habeas Corpusfor State Prisoners, 21 DE PAUL L.
REv. 682, 697-99 (1972); Wulf, Limiting Prisoner Access to Habeas Corpus-Assault on the Great
Writ, 40 BROOKLYN L. REv. 253, 269-75 (1973); cf Developments in the Law supra note 111, at
1041 (burden on states is not great because of few evidentiary hearings); Note, ProposedModiication of FederalHabeas Corpusfor State Prisoners-Reform or Revocation?, 61 GEO. L.J. 1221, 124548 1973 [hereinafter cited as Note, ProposedModiications] (citing study showing less than one
percent of federal judge time devoted to habeas corpus). But see Note, Guilt, Innocence, and
Federalism in Habeas Corpus, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 1123, 1138-39 (1980); Note, Relieving the
Habeas Corpus Burden: A JurisdictionalRemedy, 63 IOWA L. REv. 392, 411-14 (1977).
140 ANNUAL REPORT (1981), supra note 128, at 381 (Table C-4).
141 Id.
142 Id. Thus, only 2.06% of the habeas petitions resulted in an evidentiary hearing. An
average federal district judge must hold an evidentiary hearing on a habeas petition only
once every two and one-half years.
143 Id. at 402 (Table C-8). All but twelve of the evidentiary hearings were bench trials. d.
144 Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and FederalHabeas Corpusfor State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L.
REv. 441 (1963).
145 Id. at 451. Bator assumes that state courts are as capable as federal courts in determining facts and law and argues that habeas corpus review of state convictions is mere "secondguessing." Id. This assumption of parity is of questionable validity. See infra notes 179-83
and accompanying text.
146 Id. at 452. Justice Powell advanced a similar argument in Schneckloth:
At some point the law must convey to those in custody that a wrong has been committed,
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"repose" is a "psychological necessity in a secure and active society."' 147
Underlying Bator's formulation is a notion that "ultimate truth" can
never be established in the criminal justice system: "[Tihe concept of
'freedom from error' must eventually include a notion that some complex of institutional processes is empowered definitively to establish
whether or not there was error, even though in the very nature of things
1148
no such processes can give us ultimate assurances ....
Professor Bator and the Burger Court overstate their case that
habeas corpus frustrates the goal of finality. Less than 2.5% of all state
and federal prisoners file habeas petitions challenging their convictions,
and only a small percentage of these petitions ever reach the hearing
stage. Extremely few individuals ever obtain release from prison as a
result of a habeas proceeding.'

49

The importance of finality to achieving the deterrence and rehabilitation goals of the criminal justice system is also exaggerated. Empirical
support for the proposition that finality facilitates rehabilitation is lacking.' 50 Some commentators have even suggested that the existence of
that consequent punishment has been imposed, that one should no longer look back with
the view to resurrecting every imaginable basis for further litigation but rather should
look forward to rehabilitation and to becoming a constructive citizen.
412 U.S. at 262 (Powell, J., concurring).
147 Bator, supra note 11, at 452. "What I do seek is a general procedural system which
does not cater to a perpetual and unreasoned anxiety that there is a possibility that error has
been made in every criminal case in the legal system." Id. at 453.
148 Id. at 447. But f. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 130, at 1045-46 (redundancy as a
safeguard against unjust incarcerations).
The Burger Court has also relied heavily on an important article by Judge Friendly.
Friendly, supra note 71. Professor Seidman notes that in relying on Professor Bator and
Judge Friendly in its effort to limit the availability of habeas corpus, the Burger Court overlooks the fundamental antagonism between their positions. Briefly stated, Professor Bator
seeks to limit habeas corpus because to find "ultimate truth" is impossible, while Judge
Friendly wants to limit habeas corpus by focusing on the ultimate question of the guilt or
innocence of the habeas petitioner. Seidman, FactualGuilt and the Burger Court: An Exanination
of Continuity and Change in CriminalProcedure, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 436, 456-59 (1980). See also
Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 130, at 1086-9 1.
149 Extremely few habeas petitions are successful, and only a few of the petitions which are
granted ever lead to the outright release of a prisoner. See, e.g., Pollack, Proposals to Curtail
FederalHabeas Corpus ForState Prisoners: CollateralAttack on the Great Writ, 66 YALE L.J. 50, 53
(1956); Reitz, FederalHabeas Corpus: Postconviction Remedyfor State Prisoners, 108 U. PA. L. REv.
461, 479 (1960); Shapiro, supra note 130, at 339-42; Wright & Sofaer, FederalHabeas Corpusfor
State Prisoners." The Allocation of Fact-FindingResponsibility, 75 YALE L.J. 895, 899 n.1 6 (1966).
Cf. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 510 (1953) (opinion of Justice Frankfurter) ("[These] figures
• . . prove beyond peradventure that it is a baseless fear, a bogeyman, to worry lest State
convictions be upset by allowing district courts to entertain applications for habeas corpus on
behalf of prisoners under State sentence"). But see Engle v. Isaac, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 1571 (1982)
("[Ujabeas Corpus frequently cost[s] society the right to punish admitted offenders.").
150 Carroll, supra note 139, at 379; Chisum, supra note 139, at 695-97; Developments in the
Law, supra note 111, at 1058. Chisum indicated that one reason that habeas corpus may not
foster rehabilitation is that correctional officials often harass habeas petitioners and limit their
access to training and privileges. Chisum, supra note 139, at 696.
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collateral remedies is actually conducive to rehabilitation.' 5' Certainly,
one may question whether prisoners convinced of the injustice of their
convictions, yet unable to test alleged constitutional errors in a collateral
proceeding, will be amenable to rehabilitation. 52 The notion that finality enhances the deterrent value of the criminal law is similarly suspect. 153 Habeas corpus has little effect on specific deterrence since
almost all habeas petitioners are incarcerated for a period of time before
they file their petitions and remain incarcerated during the disposition
of their petitions in federal court.' 54 Moreover, because courts grant so
few habeas petitions, habeas corpus has little or no impact on the gen-

155
eral deterrent value of the criminal law.
An over-emphasis on finality imposes its own costs. Counterposed
to the goal of finality is an interest in ensuring that individuals unjustly
incarcerated will have a remedy. As Justice Brennan asked in his dissent
in Isaac, why should society "be eager to ensure the finality of a conviction arguably tainted by unreviewed constitutional error. .. .
Moreover, the very legitimacy of the criminal law may be undermined
to the extent that limits on the availability of habeas corpus increase the
number of unconstitutional incarcerations. As the Supreme Court
noted in another context, the "moral force" of the criminal law is diluted when it leaves people doubting whether innocent individuals are
57
being punished.
C.

BINDING HABEAS PETITIONERS TO THE NON-DELIBERATE FAILURE

OF DEFENSE COUNSEL TO RAISE A CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM

Fay v. Nola established that habeas petitioners forfeit federal court
review of a constitutional claim if "after consultation with competent
counsel or otherwise, [they] understandingly and knowingly forewent
the privilege of seeking to vindicate [their] federal claims in the state
151 See, e.g., Freund, Remarks at Symposium on FederalHabeas Corpus, 9 UTAti L. REv. 27, 30
(1964). Cf. Schaefer, supra note 131, at 22 ("[P]risoners whose energies are directed to getting
out of the prison by judicial process are not so likely to be concentrating on other methods of
getting out which may be less socially acceptable.").
152 Lay, Modern Administrative Proposals/orFederalHabeas Corpus.- The Rights of PrisonersPreserved, 21 DE PAUL L. REv. 701, 710-12 (1972); Developments in the Law,supra note 111, at 1058
n.l 11.
153 Carroll, supra note 139 at 378.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Engle v. Isaac, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 1581-82 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Warren
Court deemphasized the interest of finality and instead favored providing a federal forum for
habeas petitioners: "[C]onventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review."
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424 (1963).
157 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
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courts, whether for strategic, tactical, or any other reasons that can
fairly be described as the deliberate by-passing of state procedures
... M"58 While the Warren Court retreated from this standard shortly
thereafter in Henr v. Mississippi, 59 the Court retained the requirement

that only an intentional tactical decision by the defense to withhold a
claim could bar habeas relief. The Burger Court, in contrast, has more
60
closely bound the habeas petitioner to the actions of defense counsel,'
barring habeas relief if trial counsel has unintentionally failed to raise a
constitutional claim. 16' According to the Burger Court, defense attorneys will thus be deterred from circumventing state courts with a consti162
tutional claim, a practice commonly known as "sandbagging."'
This position is troubling in several respects. First, the Burger
Court ignores the fact that most procedural defaults stem from the negligence, inexperience, or incompetence of defense counsel and not from a
deliberate decision by defense counsel to avoid the trial court.' 63 Few
reasonable defense attorneys will forego constitutional challenges in
state courts in order to save them for a subsequent habeas proceeding;
sandbagging increases the likelihood of conviction and precludes all
state appellate and direct Supreme Court review of the issue.' 64 In ad158 372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963).
159 379 U.S. 443 (1965). For a thorough discussion of the Warren Court's position, see
Rosenberg, Jettinsoning Fay v.Noja: ProceduralDefaults by Reasonably Incompetent Counsel, 62
MINN. L. REv. 341 (1978).
160 For an analysis of the Burger Court's position, see Rosenberg, supra note 159; Tague,
FederalHabeas CorpusandIneective Representationof Counsel." The Supreme Court has Work to Do, 31
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1978).
16t According to the Burger Court, the defense attorney will have full responsibility for all
trial decisions, including those of a constitutional dimension, except for a few "fundamental"
decisions such as jury waiver, which are left to the defendant. Chief Justice Burger outlined
this view in Sykes:
Once counsel is appointed, the day-to-day conduct of the defense rests with the
attorney. He, not the client, has the immediate-and ultimate-responsibility of deciding if and when to object, which witnesses, if any, to call, and what defenses to develop.
Not only do these decisions rest with the attorney, but such decisions must, as a practical
matter, be made without consulting the client ...
Since trial decisions are of necessity entrusted to the accused's attorney, the FayZerbst standard of "knowing and intelligent waiver" is simply inapplicable.
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
Isaac illustrates the Court's willingness to bind the habeas petitioner to the non-deliberate action or omission of the defense which leads to a procedural default. 102 S. Ct. at 157275. See also Spritzer, Criminal Waiver, ProceduralDefault and the Burger Court, 126 U. PA. L. REV.
473, 504-09 (1978).
162 See, e.g., Sykes, 433 U.S. at 89-90.
163 Hill, The Inadequate State Ground, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 941-97 (1965); Tague, supra note
160, at 46; Comment, supra note 85, at 996-98. The number of procedural defaults is surprisingly high. See infia note 170.
164 As Justice Brennan noted in Sykes:
[The defense attorney] could elect to "sandbag." This presumably means, first, that he
would hold back the presentation of his constitutional claim to the trial court, thereby
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dition, there are significant costs to pursuing a sandbagging strategy because defendants must remain incarcerated for months, if not years,
while their attorneys carry out this scheme. 6 5 Moreover, the prospects
for eventual release in a habeas proceeding are statistically quite dismal.1 66 Second, the uneven quality of the criminal defense bar,167 the

institutional realities of representing indigent criminal defendants,1 68
and the dynamics of the attorney-client relationship169 foster a large
increasing the likelihood of a conviction since the prosecution would be able to present
evidence that, while arguably constitutionally deficient, may be highly prejudicial to the
defense. Second, he would thereby have forfeited all state review and remedies with respect to these claims (subject to whatever "plain error" rule is available). Third, to carry
out his scheme he would now be compelled to deceive the federal habeas court and to
convince the judge that he did not "deliberately bypass" the state procedures. If he loses
on this gamble, all federal review would be barred, and his "sandbagging" would have
resulted in nothing but the forfeiture of all judicial review of his client's claims.
Sykes, 433 U.S. at 103 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
t65 Tague, supra note 160, at 44-45.
166 See supra note 149.
167 See generally Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REv. I (1973); cf.
Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy, 42 FORDHAM L. REv. 227 (1973) (estimates that 40% of
the trial attorneys do not provide adequate representation). See also R. HERMANN, E. SINGLE,

J. BOSTON,

COUNSEL FOR THE POOR: CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN URBAN AMERICA (1973).

168 A study of the Philadelphia public defender office found that the amount of attorney
time which could be alloted to each criminal defense case was extremely limited. Note, Client
Service in a Defender Organization: The PhiladelphiaExperience, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 448 (1969).
The study found that the average time devoted to pre-trial review and consultation time for
defendants accused of violent crimes was 87 minutes, id. at 456, and that the total legal time
expended from arrest through conviction or acquittal averaged just five hours and thirty-nine
minutes. Id. at 456. See also Benner, Tokenism and the American Indigent. Some Perspectives on
Defense Services, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 667 (1975). Benner identifies several shortcomings in
the provision of criminal defense services to the poor: (1) lack of uniformity in the provision
of services; (2) lack of investigatory or other expert assistance; (3) high turnover of underpaid,
undertrained, and overworked attorneys; (4) lack of client confidence in public defender system; (5) lack of defense services at arrest stage, with a resulting loss of constitutional rights
and evidence; (6) lack of counsel for misdemeanors; and (7) lack of social service support
facilities. Id. at 671-75.
See also Wice & Suwak, Current Realities of Public Defender Programs.- A National Survey and
Anabsi, 10 CRIM. L. BULL. 161 (1974); Note, Identifying and Remedying Inefective Assistance of
CriminalDefense Counsel A New Look After UnitedStates v. DeCoster, 93 HARV. L. REv. 752, 776780 (1980).
169 Cover and Aleinikoff indentify three reasons why the interests of the defense attorney
may differ from those of the client. First, public defenders act within an organizational structure which may limit the vigor of their advocacy. High caseloads and resource limitations
may lead to more guilty pleas and longer incarcerations. Poor working conditions and inadequate compensation hinder the development of a corps of well-trained public defense attorneys. Moreover, the public defender's need to maintain a good working relationship with
judges and prosecutors may affect the nature and vigor of their defense work. Second, market
conditions force privately retained attorneys to maintain a high volume of low-fee cases,
which creates an incentive for plea bargaining arrangements. Appointed counsel may not
only be poorly compensated but also reap few professional gains from criminal defense work;
these factors are strong disincentives for pursuing a vigorous defense. Third, some defense
strategies may offend the community as well as the court. For example, defense counsel may
be reluctant to charge racial discrimination in jury selection. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note
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number of non-deliberate procedural defaults.' 7 0 Third, the deterrent
value of' punishing defendants for the inadequacies of their attorneys
appears to be slight.' 7' Even assuming the existence of such a deterrent
effect, the prisoner's forfeiture of appellate remedies and the loss of the
opportunity for early release should be sufficient to deter sandbagging. 172 Finally, the Court ignores the nearly insurmountable obstacles
that
that face prisoners who seek to prove in a collateral proceeding
73
counsel.'
of
assistance
ineffective
rendered
attorney
their
The Burger Court's solution may therefore be worse than the problem. Unable to meet the cause-and-prejudice standard, habeas petition74
ers will more frequently claim ineffective assistance of counsel.'
Pressuring habeas petitioners to attack the competence of counsel has a
detrimental effect on the attorney-client relationship.' 75 This emphasis
on ineffective assistance will increase the habeas workload of the federal
courts 76 and force the courts to make intrusive inquiries into the adequacy of counsel, state regulation of the criminal defense bar, and judi177
cial behavior at trial.
D.

THE ASSUMPTION OF STATE COURT PARITY AND THE

INTRUSIVENESS OF HABEAS CORPUS

In restricting the scope of federal habeas corpus, the Burger Court
assumes that state courts are both willing and able to provide the same
130, at 1079-83. .See also Tague, The Attempt to Improve Criminal Defense Representation, 15 AM.
CRhm. L. REV. 109, 130-131 (1977).
170 A study of the representation of assigned counsel, for example, found that over 40% of
the criminal appeals before the Virginia Supreme Court were affirmed without iconsideration
of constitutional issues because of the failure of counsel to make proper objections at trial.
Bd. of Governors, Crim. L. Section of Virginia State Bar, A Study of the Defense of Indigents
in Virginia (1971) (report to the Governor and the General Assembly of Virginia), cited in
Benner, supra note 168, at 680 n.52 (1975).
171 As Justice Brennan argued in Skes:
Punishing a lawyer's unintentional errors by closing the federal courthouse door to
his client is both a senseless and misdirected method of deterring the slighting of state
rules. It is senseless because unplanned and unintentional action of any kind generally is
not subject to deterrence; and, to the extent that it is hoped that a threatened sanction
addressed to the defense will induce greater care and caution on the part of trial lawyers,
thereby forestalling negligent conduct or error, the potential loss of all valuable state
remedies would be sufficient to this end. And it is a misdirected sanction because even if
the penalization of incompetence or carelessness will encourage more thorough legal
training and trial preparation, the habeas applicant, as opposed to his lawyer, hardly is
the proper recipient of such a penalty.
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 113 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting)(footnotes omitted).
172 Reitz, supra note 11, at 1351.
173 See Tague, supra note 169, at 152-161.
174 See generaly Tague, supra note 160.
t75 Tague, supra note 160, at 66.
176 Id.

t77 Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 130, at 1083-86.
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degree of protection to the constitutional rights of criminal defendants
that federal courts provide. As Justice Powell stated in Stone v. Powell:
"Despite differences in institutional environment and the unsympathetic
attitude to federal constitutional claims of some state judges in years
past, we are unwilling to assume that there now exists a general lack of
appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights in the trial and appellate
78
courts of the several States."
The existence of parity between the state and federal court systems
is not, however, self-evident. One commentator has identified three reasons why federal judges are generally better able to vindicate constitutional rights. 179 First, the level of technical competence is generally
higher among federal judges because they are selected through a more
thorough selection process and have lighter caseloads, better support
services, and higher salaries.' 80 Second, because the federal judiciary
has a strong elite tradition and a closer bureaucratic relationship to the
Supreme Court than to state criminal justice systems, federal courts are
more sympathetic to constitutional claims.18 1 Moreover, in collateral
proceedings federal judges are better able to focus on constitutional issues and are less concerned with troubling fact situations or the need to
make determinations of guilt or innocence. 182 Third, federal judges have
lifelong tenure and therefore are more insulated from majoritarian
83
pressure. 1
Because the Burger Court assumes that parity exists between state
and federal courts, it has applied the doctrine of comity to limit the
availability of federal habeas corpus review of state criminal convictions.
It considers habeas corpus to be unduly intrusive, "frustrat[ing] both the
States' sovereign power to punish offenders and their good faith attempts to honor constitutional rights." 18 4 According to this view, habeas
corpus undermines the confidence of state judges in their decisions and
acts as a powerful disincentive for their zealous vindication of constitu178 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 n.35 (1976).
179 Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1105 (1977).
180 Id. at 1121-1124.
181 Id. at 1124-1127. See also Flagg, Stone v. Powell and the New Federalism: A Challenge to
Congress, 14 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 152, 162-63 (1976); Developments in the Law, supra note 111, at
1060-61.
182 Flagg,supra note 181, at 162; Schaefer, supra note 131, at 7. Cf. Developments in the Law,
supra note 111, at 1057 ("The momentum of the trial process and the trial judge's focus upon
the central issue of the accused's guilt or innocence may tend to divert attention from ancillary questions relating to constitutional guarantees.") (footnotes omitted).
183 Chisum, supra note 139, at 692; Neuborne, supra note 179, at 1127; Schaefer, supra note
131, at 7. See also The Bench Meets the Ballot, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 1, 1982, at 1, col. 1. But see
Developments in the Law, supra note 111, at 1060.
184 Engle v. Issac, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 1571 (1982).
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tional rights.1 5
The alleged intrusiveness of habeas corpus is exaggerated. First,
the number of habeas cases that reach the evidentiary hearing stage is so
small that, even if all cases were resolved against the state, an average of
four judgments per state per year would be affected.' 8 6 Second, the
Court ignores the narrow focus of habeas corpus. Habeas corpus actions
are civil proceedings in which only the constitutionality of the confinement of a single person is at issue; the remedy is directed not at the state
judiciary but at the penal institution where the petitioner is confined. 187
A ruling in favor of a habeas petitioner leaves states free to enforce their
procedural rules.'88 On balance, federal court reversal of a state court
judgment on the merits is more intrusive than a habeas corpus decision
adverse to the state.189

The Burger Court also ignores the key role played by habeas corpus
in extending federal constitutional protections to state criminal defendants. 190 Because the Supreme Court is unable to correct all unjust incarcerations on direct review, federal district courts in effect have been
delegated to use habeas corpus to routinely correct gross constitutional
abuses at the state level. 19 1 This function of habeas corpus may stimulate improvements in state criminal justice systems 19 2 and greater uniformity in state application of constitutional law. Restrictions on the
availability of habeas corpus thus limits a constructive dialogue on constitutional issues between the state and federal court systems

193

and in-

creases the likelihood that the constitutional rights of criminal
defendants will not be honored in state criminal justice systems. 194
Finally, there remains the question of whether the Supreme Court
should restrict the availability of habeas corpus in the face of Congress's
185 Id. at 1571-72.
186 See Chisum, supra note 139, at 693.
187 See,e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,430-31 (1963).See aso Reitz,supra note 111, at 134748.
188 Reitz, supra note 111, at 1347-49; Note, FederalHabeas CorpusforState isoners: The Isolation Principle, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 78, 131-134 (1964).
189 Tague, supra note 160, at 49.
190 Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 130, at 1041-42; Mishkin, Foreword.- The High Court, The
Great Hit, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REv. 56, 86-87; Spritzer, supra
note 161, at 473; Wright and Sofaer, supra note 149, at 897-98.
191 Friendly, supra note 71, at 155; Wright & Sofaer, supra note 149, at 897-98; Developments
in the Law, supra note 111, at 1061.
192 Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 130, at 1046; Lay, supra note 152, at 714; Reitz, supra
note 111, at 1352-54.
193 See, e.g., Cover & Aleinikoffsupra note 130, at 1045-48. See also Reitz,supra note 111, at
1350; Shapiro, supra note 130, at 339-42.
194 See, e.g., Neuborne, supra note 179, at 1105-06.
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refusal to change the habeas corpus statute.

95

In the last three decades,

at least three major proposals that would have placed severe limits on
the availability of habeas corpus 96 have been rejected by Congress.
The Burger Court has not provided substantial legislative support for its
limits on habeas corpus. 197 Its efforts have been a "conspicuous exercise
in judicial activism."1

98

V.

CONCLUSION

In Engle v. Isaac and United States v. Frady, the Supreme Court further limited the availability of federal habeas corpus to petitioners raising a constitutional claim that had been forfeited due to a procedural
default. The decisions extend the Wainwright v. Sykes cause-and-actual
prejudice standard to errors involving the truthfinding function of trial
and preclude federal courts from noticing "plain error" in collateral proceedings. The Court also made the "cause" and "prejudice" prongs of
the Sykes standard extremely difficult tests for habeas petitioners to
meet.
Isaac, Frady, and prior Burger Court decision that have progressively limited access to habeas corpus relief reflect a strong hostility to
providing a federal forum for collateral attacks on allegedly unconstitutional convictions. In these decisions, the Court overstates the burden
that habeas corpus places on the federal judiciary, the degree to which
the availability of habeas corpus undermines the finality of criminal
judgments, and the extent to which federal habeas corpus intrudes into
state criminal justice systems. Moreover, by binding habeas petitioners
with the errors, omissions, or negligence of defense counsel who have
failed to object to an alleged error, the Burger Court unfairly punishes
habeas petitioners for the inadequacies of defense counsel. Finally, by
insisting that habeas petitioners must satisfy both the "cause" and "actual prejudice" prongs of the Sykes test, the Burger Court evidences a
high tolerance for the unconstitutional incarceration of both the guilty
and the innocent.
THOMAS

J.

BAMONTE

195 Justice Brennan raised this issue in his dissent in Sykes. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S.
72, 105-07 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
196 See, e.g. ,S. 597, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S. 917, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); H.R.
5649, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955). See also Pollack,supra note 149; Note, ProposedModifcations,
supra note 139.
197 In contrast, the Brown Court relied heavily on an analysis of the habeas corpus statute.
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
198 Engle v. Isaac, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 1576 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

